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THE TAX TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS
Blake D. Rubii, Beth Green, and Katherine P. Rosefsky
Steptoo & Johnson, Washington, D.C.!-
November 7, 1994
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Over the past two decades, businesses have faced an
increasing burden of environmental regulation. In
particular, under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
("CERCLA"), liability for cleaning up contaminated
sites may attach to any potentially responsible party
("PRP").
B. In addition, businesses and landowners may be forced to
incur costs to bring their property into compliance
with environmental regulations -- for example, large
expenses are often incurred in the removal of asbestos
from buildings or equipment.
C. To date, many companies have treated environmental
cleanup costs as current deductions in computing tax-
able income. However, in two recent Technical Advice
Memoranda ("TAMs") the Internal Revenue Service (the
"Service") has required taxpayers to capitalize such
costs. A third TAM represents a shift by the Service
towards allowing current deductions for certain
environmental cleanup costs. A subsequent revenue
ruling appears to have solidified this change in
position.
D. Sections II and III of this outline discuss the first
two recent TAMs that required capitalization of
environmental cleanup costs. Section IV summarizes
informal comments of the Service after these TAMs and
the reactions of the private sector. Section V and VI
discuss the third TAM and the revenue ruling. Section
VII presents the informal comments of the Service after
the revenue ruling and the reactions of the private
sector. Section VIII analyzes the relevant case law,
and Section IX discusses other considerations which may
bear on the proper tax treatment of environmental
cleanup costs.
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II. TAM 9240004 - ASBESTOS REMOVAL
A. In TAM 9240004, the taxpayer owned-a manufacturing
plant whose equipment was insulated with asbestos-
containing materials. In response to governmental
regulations covering airborne asbestos concentrations,
the taxpayer decided to remove all of the asbestos-
containing materials and to replace them with alterna-
tive forms of insulation. The replacement insulation
was less thermally efficient than the asbestos-
containing insulation which it replaced.
B. The Service concentrated on the fact that the asbestos
abatement program made the taxpayer's plant more valu-
able by reducing or eliminating the human health risks
posed by asbestos-containing insulation.
C. Plainfield-Union
1. The taxpayer argued based on Plainfield Union
Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333 (1962),
noncg , 1964-2 C.B. 8, that in determining if the
value of property was increased by an expenditure,
the proper comparison is not to the value of the
property immediately before the expenditure, but
rather the value of the property before the exis-
tence of the condition necessitating the expendi-
ture.
a. In Plainfield Union, the taxpayer, a water
utility, incurred costs to clean 6,000 feet
of water main and to install cement linings
in the pipe.
b. The cleaning and lining was required, in
part, because the water main, installed in
1910 with tar lining, had been designed to
carry well water, but in 1950 had begun to
carry river water which was more acidic and
hence caused "tuberculation," which progres-
sively reduced water flow.
C. Rejecting the Service's contention that the
expenditures must be capitalized because they
increased the value of the pipe, the court
noted that "any properly performed repair
adds value as compared to the situation
existing immediately prior to the repair.
The proper test is whathr =hc -- 1d' ture
materially enhances the value, use, life
expectancy, strength, or capacity as compared
with the status of the asset p3rior to the
condition necessitating the expenditure." 39
T.C. at 338 (emphasis added).
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2. In TAM 9240004, the Service attempted to limit
Plainfield Union to facts where the expenditure
was necessitated because the property progressive-
ly deteriorated over time.
a. To support this assertion the Service cited
two cases, Oberman Mfc. Co. v. Commissioner,
47 T.C. 471 (1967), aca., 1967-2 C.B. 3, and
Niagara Mohawk Power CorD. v. United States,
558 F.2d 1379 (Ct. Cl.).
b. Both of these cases cite Plainfield Union
with approval, and both involve situations
where repair expenses were necessitated
because of progressive deterioration, but
neither indicates that the relevance of
Plainfield Union was limited to such a
situation.
D. Added value
The Service relied on the fact that by removing
asbestos-containing materials from its plant, the
taxpayer in TAM 9240004 had increased the value of its
property by bringing the plant into compliance with
governmental regulations, and thus allowing the tax-
payer to continue to operate its business. To support
this argument, the Service cited a number of cases.
Teitelbaum v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 541 (7th Cir.
1961) (cost of converting building's electrical system
from D.C. to A.C. in order to comply with city ordi-
nance must be capitalized), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1965); RKO Theatres. Inc. v. United States, 163 F.
Supp. 598 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (cost of installing new exits
and fire escapes to comply with city regulations must
be capitalized); Hotel Sulgrave. Inc. v. Commissioner,
21 T.C. 619 (1954) (cost of installing a sprinkler
system in order to comply with order of city building
department must be capitalized); Beaven v. CoMmission-
er, 6 T.C.M. 1344 (1943) (cost of converting from oil
heat to coal heat because of war-time oil conservation
laws must be capitalized).
E. Repair v. Permanent Improvement
Next the Service argued that a repair is not a perma-
nent cure, but only a remedy for immediate conse-
quences, while section 263 requires the capitalization
of any costs associated with permanent oiprrv a -z
betterments.
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1. In support of this argument, the Service cited
American Bembera CorD. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.
361 (1946), nonaca., 1948-2 C.B. 5, aff'd per
curiam, 177 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1949).
2. The Service noted that in American Bembera the Tax
court had, in allowing a deduction for costs
incurred to prevent cave-ins due to a geological
fault, stressed that the original geological
defect had not been cured, and rather that its
immediate consequences had been dealt with.
F. INDQPQ
Finally, the Service cited INDOPCO. Inc. v. Commission-
r, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992), for the proposition that
capitalization was required because the removal of the
asbestos-containing insulation would create benefits
extending beyond the taxable year in which the costs
were incurred.
III. TAM 9315004 - PCB CLEANUP
A. In TAM 9315004, the taxpayer had, prior to 1972, used
PCB-containing lubricants in its machinery. At the
time of such use, PCBs were not viewed as posing any
risk to health or the environment.
1. As part of its maintenance routine the taxpayer
removed lubricants from its machinery and disposed
of them in earthen pits and trenches on its prop-
erty. Because of the prior use of the PCB-
containing lubricants in the machinery, this
resulted in PCBs being introduced into the soil on
the taxpayer's property.
2. The EPA became aware of the presence of PCBs in
the soil on the taxpayer's property and commenced
actions against the taxpayer. The taxpayer
entered into an agreement with the EPA whereby it
agreed to
a. Test the levels of PCBs at specific sites on
its property,
b. Conduct an environmental cleanup of sites
where the levels of PCBs exceeded permissible
levels, and
C. Perform periodic environmental "audits" to
examine and evaluate that status of its
compliance with the agreement.
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B. From the start, the Service took a slightly different
posture in TAM 9315004 than it did in TAM 9240004,
stating early on that the distinctions between current
expenses and capital expenditures "are those of degree
and not of kind" (quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.
111, 114 (1933)).
C. Treas, Reaq. 1.162-4
The Service also focused more closely on the language
of the regulations authorizing a deduction for repair
expenses.
I. Treas. Reg. S 1.162-4 allows a deduction for "the
cost of incidental repairs which neither add
materially to the value of the property nor ap-
preciably prolong its life, but keep it in an
ordinarily efficient operating condition."
2. From this language, the Service distilled four
separate requirements, all of which must be met if
the repair cost is to be deducted.
a. The repair must be incidental,
b. The cost of the repair must not materially
add to the value of the property,
C. The repair must not appreciably prolong the
useful life of the property, and
d. The purpose of the expenditure must be to
keep the property in ordinarily efficient
operating condition.
D. The "Incidental" Reauirement
Although setting forth as a requirement of deducti-
bility that repairs must be "incidental," the Service
acknowledged that the cost of work performed is not
dispositive. In addition, the Service stated, one must
look to the nature of the work in relation to the tax-
payer's operations. The Service never squarely re-
solved this issue in TAM 9315004, but because removal
of PCBs was clearly not a core part of the taxpayer's
business, and because the Service's analysis quickly
moved on to other factors, it may be assumed that the
Service conceded that the environmental cleanup costs
were "iacidental" to the taxpayer's business.
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E. Addition of Material Value - The Wolfsen Case
The Service's found that the costs of cleaning up PcB
contamination added material value to the taxpayer's
property and hence must be capitalized. The analysis
supporting this conclusion rested in large part upon
its analysis of Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1 (1979).
1. In Wlfsen, the taxpayer undertook a systematic
draglining of the ditches which constituted the
irrigation system for its cattle ranch. The
purpose of the draglining was to restore to
original capacity ditches which had become clogged
with sediment and other materials.
2. Draglining was required approximately every 10
years, but could have been avoided if the taxpayer
instead had adopted a plan of annual maintenance.
3. Although acknowledging that the purpose of the
draglining, i.., restoring the property to its
original operating state, was "a maintenance-type
expense," the Tax Court required capitalization
because "[t]o permit a current deduction of such a
large expenditure with a beneficial effect lasting
on the average of 10 years would surely distort
that year's income." 72 T.C. at 13.
4. Instead, the Tax Court held that the expenditures
created "a free-standing intangible asset with an
amortizable 10-year life." I&.
5. The Tax Court's argument included a certain meas-
ure of circularity. In finally concluding that
the expenses for draglining were not deductible,
the court stated that "[w)e also believe that to
the extent that the expenditures have the effect
of replacing the previously wasted intangible
created by the last-draqlining of the subject
ditch or levee, they have -a substantial impact on
the value of the system, as well as producing a
separate item of value." 72 T.C. at 17.
a. The Tax Court created the amortizable intan-
gible asset to ameliorate the effect of its
refusal to allow a current deduction for the
draglining expenses, but it then used the
existpne ^f *h- aset as support for its
decision to disallow the deduction in the
first place.
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b. Part of the problem in Wolfsen arises from
the fact that there was apparently no attempt
to amortize any portion of the acquisition
costs of the ranch attributable to the irri-
gation system. Instead, it seems to have
been conceded by all parties that the irriga-
tion system had an indeterminate or infinite
useful life.
c. If the irrigation system had been depreciated
all along, then the Tax Court's finding that
draglining expenses restore the value previ-
ously claimed through amortization would have
had support from the facts of the case. In-
stead, the reasoning fails, because it treats
the costs as incurred to restore value, the
loss of which was never claimed through any
amortization allowance or other means. If,
in contrast, the decline in value of the ir-
rigation system had been claimed through
depreciation deductions, it would have been
more appropriate to deny a deduction for the
repairs. I= Treas. Reg. S 1.263(a)-i (capi-
talization required for any amounts expended
to restore property for which depreciation
has been allowed).
F. ADvlication of Wolfsen in TAM 9315004
1. The Service's position
The Service likened the taxpayer's environmental
cleanup costs to the costs in Wlfsen in several
respects.
a. The taxpayer failed to perform ongoing main-
tenance with the result that a large-scale
operation was later required. In this
regard, the Service was unmoved by the tax-
payer's argument that because it was unaware
of the health and environmental risks posed
by PCBs it could not have been expected to
use an alternative means of disposal.
b. The expenditures were part of a systematic
plan involving extensive remediation activi-
ties throughout the property.
c. The valu of the'A taxpayer-s property was
increased as a-result of the remediation
activities.
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2. The taxpayer's position
The taxpayer attempted to distinguish its situa-
tion from W on the grounds that in TAM
9315004 the taxpayer's equipment was operational
at the time the costs were incurred, while in
W the costs were incurred in order to re-
store the -irrigation-system to a functioning
condition.
a. The Service rejected this argument as
irrelevant, citing Blue Creek Coal. Inc. v.
Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. 1504 (1984), where a
taxpayer was required to capitalize the cost
of installing enclosed cabs bulldozers in
order to comply with an order of the federal
Mine, Health and Safety Administration.
b. In Blue Creek Coal, the operational state of
the bulldozers was a fact relied on as
SpPOrt for the capitalization of the costs,
the court reasoning that the work could not
be a repair if the bulldozers were already
fully operational before the costs were
incurred.
G. Prolonging Life
The examining agent had not asserted that the cleanup
costs prolonged the life of any asset, hence the TAM
did not address this issue. Presumably, where cleanup
costs relate to land, which is treated for purposes of
the tax laws as if it has an infinite life, the Service
will never assert that cleanup costs are incurred to
prolong the life of the land.
H. ordinary Operatinci Condition
The TAM never directly addressed the issue of whether
the cleanup costs were incurred to maintain the tax-
payer's property in an ordinary operating condition or
for some other purpose. This issue was, however, tan-
gentially addressed in the discussion of B
; (see above). This prong of the regulations is
difficult to apply in circumstances like the PCB-
cleanup involved in TAM 9315004, because the taxpayer's
property is in operating condition before the cleanup,
except for restrictions imposed by governmental reula-
tions or potential tort liability.
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I. Effect of Government Regulations
In TAM 9315004, like in TAM 9240004, the Service also
relied on the fact that the costs were incurred in
order to comply with governmental regulations. In TAM
9315004, however, the Service went further, denying the
taxpayer's assertion that the cited cases stood for the
proposition that otherwise capitalizable expenditures
do not become deductible merely because incurred as a
result of governmental regulation.
J. The Service Explicitly Rejects Plainfield Union
The Service also signalled that it will reject any
argument based on Plainfield Union, stating that "if
the Plainfield Union 'increase in value' test was the
only factor used in determining whether an expenditure
should be categorized as a deductible repair or capital
expenditure, then any replacement of a capital asset
would also be deductible. We do not believe, especial-
ly in light of the Tax Court's more recent decision in
Wo , that the court intended such a narrow applica-
tion of the inquiry into value."
K. Plan of Rehabilitation
Having already determined that it did not consider the
taxpayer's expenditures in TAM 9315004 to constitute
deductible repairs, the Service went further and but-
tressed its conclusion through its analysis of the
"plan of rehabilitation" doctrine.
1. Stated simply, the "plan of rehabilitation" doc-
trine, a judicially created rule, provides that
costs otherwise deductible as repairs must be
capitalized if they are undertaken as part of a
general plan of rehabilitation. The doctrine has
its genesis in Cowell v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A.
997, where costs incurred in the rehabilitation of
a hotel, including rewiring, replumbing, replacing
a roof and windows, and painting were held to be
capital expenditures. Although any of the costs,
if incurred alone, may have been deductible, the
court held that the determination of deductible
repair vs. capital expenditure depends on "whether
it is part of the entire capital investment in the
improved property." 18 B.T.A. at 1002.
2. Whether a systematic series of repairs const ...
a plan of rehabilitation generally depends upon
the facts and circumstances of each case. Wehrli
v. United States, 400 U.S. 686 (10th Cir. 1968).
- 10 -
a. Many of the cases finding that repairs are
undertaken pursuant to a plan of rehabilita-
tion and thus must be capitalized involve
plans to rehabilitate run-down buildings.
See e.g., Jones v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 563
(1955), aff'd, 242616 (5th Cir. 1957); HoM
News Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 18
B.T.A. 1008 (1930).
b. Furthermore, many of these cases involved
buildings which were acquired in their di-
lapidated state, and thus the repair costs
could be viewed as a form of additional
acquisition cost and hence more clearly
capital in nature. Id.
c. In general, prior to a finding that the plan
of rehabilitation doctrine applies to require
the capitalization of the costs of repairs,
courts also find that the overall improvement
to the taxpayer's property is of a kind which
would otherwise meet the requirements of
capitalization under section 263. See e.a..,
Mountain Fuel SuDDl Co. v. United States,
449 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1971) (expenses in-
curred in reconditioning pipeline must be
capitalized where they "substantially pro-
longed the life" of the affected pipe); Jones
v. Commissioner, (the results of the
plan were "tantamount to new construction
'more like the reconstruction of a building
gutted by fire than ordinary repairs to old
apartments.'").
d. In this context, the distinction between re-
pairs and a plan of rehabilitation requiring
capitalization has been described as the dif-
ference between "keeping" an asset in good
condition and "putting" it in good condition.
M6ss V. commissioner, 87-2 U.S.T.C. 9590
(10th Cir. 1987); Mountain Fuel SupDlv Co. V.
United States, supra.
(2) Although cited by a number of commenta-
tors in support of the current deducti-
bility of cleanup costs, it seems this
formulation of the test may often point
in favor of capitalization.
(2) In the case of cleanup costs, as opposed
to waste treatment costs or other pre-
ventive measures, it seems that the
costs are indeed incurred to "put" the
taxpayer's property in good condition.
I1o
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3. Because of the long-term nature and broad scope of
the taxpayer's cleanup in TAM 9315004, and because
of the benefits which would flow from the cleanup,
the Service concluded that the cleanup project
constituted a general plan of rehabilitation, the
costs of which must be capitalized.
L. Leaal Fees and Other Costs
TAM 9315004 also considered the treatment of legal fees
and the costs of the "environmental audit" incurred in
connection with the cleanup of the taxpayer's PCB
contaminated land.
1. With regard to legal fees, the Service concluded
that the costs were not incurred to create or
enhance an asset or to produce a long-term bene-
fit, but rather to protect the taxpayer's business
by defending it against claims, and securing its
contractual rights with insurers. Hence, the legal
fees were currently deductible.
2. The taxpayer also incurred "oversight costs" in
connection with its cleanup operations. These
costs were not clearly described in the TAM, but
because they were described as "incurred pursuant
to the plan of rehabilitation" the Service con-
cluded that the costs must be capitalized.
3. Finally, the taxpayer incurred "environmental
audit" costs in connection with the identification
of contaminated sites and the monitoring of such
sites once they were identified. The TAM con-
cluded that the proper tax treatment of such costs
required-further factual development.
M. Treatment of Capitalized Costs
Despite the fact that the costs incurred by the tax-
payer in TAM 9315004 related primarily to soil remedia-
tion and thus might be expected to be capitalized into
the cost of the taxpayer's land, the Service allowed
the taxpayer to add such costs to the depreciable basis
of its equipment. This result has been criticized by
at least one Treasury Department official who described
it as the Service trying to be "nice." See 60 Tax
Notes 926 (Aug. 16, 1993)-(Robert Kilinskis speaking at
an August 6, 1993 meeting of Regulated Public Utilities
Committ-a the a I a- Seci4-n).
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IV. AFTERMATH OF ThE TWO TAMs
A. The Service's Study and the Five Factors
i. Following the issuance of the two TAMs, the Ser-
vice announced plans to study the tax treatment of
environmental cleanup costs in greater depth. At
that time, the -Service identified five factors
which it considered to be of relevance in deter-
mining whether cleanup costs should be deducted or
capitalized. See 59 Tax Notes 1408 (Mar. 15,
1993) (Stuart R. Brown speaking at a March 9 meet-
ing of the Federal Bar Association Tax Section).
a. Whether the costs relate to the creation of
new property or to the cleaning up of
existing property;
b. Whether the property on which the cleanup is
performed is owned by the taxpayer;
c. Whether the property on which the cleanup is
performed will produce future income;
d. Whether the problem necessitating the cleanup
was present when the property was acquired by
the taxpayer or if it arose in the course of
the taxpayer's business; and
e. Whether the expenditure is voluntary or is
involuntarily imposed by a governmental
order.
2. More recently, Service officials have indicated
that this list was merely preliminary and that any
final guidance would likely include additional
factors and might not include all the factors
listed above.
B. Private Sector Reaction
1. In early March of 1993, at the time it announced
the five factors that it considered to be of
relevance in determining whether cleanup costs
should be deducted or capitalized, the Service
asked practitioners for responses to its proposed
factors and comments as to whether the factors
should be developed in the form of guidance (such
as a published ruling) or whether the Service
should decide the issue on a case by case basis
(through technical advice and private rulings).
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2. Not surprisingly, the comments received have gen-
erally requested published guidance which would
provide that cleanup costs are currently
deductible in most circumstances.
a. In particular, it has been suggested that the
Service adopt a bright-line test under which
-a taxpayer would always be permitted to de-
duct costs incurred in connection with a
cleanup of property not owned by the taxpayer
(e.a., cleanup costs incurred as a PRP in
connection with a Superfund site).
b. Many commentators have argued strongly that
deductibility results in a more appropriate
matching of income and expense than does
capitalization. This is particularly the
case, the commentators argue, where the en-
vironmental problem arose from the taxpayer's
operations and thus can clearly be linked to
previously earned income (see above).
c. A number of commentators have suggested as an
exception to a general rule of deductibility,
however, the case where costs are incurred to
remediate recently purchased property where
the necessity of cleanup activities was known
and taken into account in the negotiation of
the purchase price.
d. Commentators have, in general, rejected as
irrelevant the Service's suggestion that the
voluntary or involuntary nature of the clean-
up costs be considered in determining if the
costs should be capitalized or deducted.
(1) The commentators note that case law
generally states that whether a parti-
cular cost is incurred pursuant to
governmental regulation does not deter-
mine if the cost should be deducted or
capitalized. See. e.a., Commissioner v.
Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S.
345 (1971).
(2) Furthermore, it may be argued, the adop-
tion of a rule providing that voluntary
payments are more likely to be capital-
ized would discourage taxpayers from
voluntary compliance with cleanup laws,
while a rule that involuntary payments
are more likely to be capitalized would
penalize taxpayers for attempting to as-
sert their rights in court. Neither of
- 14 -
the results would be desirable from an
environmental policy standpoint.
V. TAM 9411002 - ASBESTOS ABATEMENT
A. In TAM 9411002 (Nov. 19, 1993), the taxpayer owned (i)
a boiler house with asbestos-laden equipment and (ii) a
warehouse with exposed or damaged asbestos-containing
pipe insulation. The boiler house equipment had
originally heated the warehouse, but the equipment was
no longer in use. In order to secure a bank loan, the
taxpayer (i) removed all asbestos-containing materials
located within the boiler house and (ii) encapsulated
the exposed or damaged asbestos-containing pipe
insulation in the warehouse (which involved less than
25% of the warehouse's pipes). The taxpayer
subsequently converted the boiler house into garage and
office space.
B. The Service required capitalization of equipment
removal costs,, but it allowed a deduction for the pipe
encapsulation costs.
C. EauiDment Removal Costs - Capitalization Reauired
The Service applied the test of Plainfield Union
Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333 (1962),
flnalq,, 1964-2 C.B. 8. The Service found that,
in contrast to the facts in Plainfield Union, the
costs incurred by the taxpayer to remove the
asbestos-containing materials "increased the
value, use, and capacity of the taxpayer's
property as compared to the.status of its property
in its original asbestos-containing condition."
a. The expenditures added value in three
respects:-
(1) The expenditures permanently eliminated
the health risks created by the presence
of asbestos in the boiler house, thereby
improving operating conditions and
preventing future contamination of
employees or lessees..
(2) The expenditures made the property
"significantly more attractive to
potential buyers, investors, lenders,
and customers."
114
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(3) The expenditures enabled the taxpayer to
convert the boiler house into office
space and a garage, thereby "adapt[ing
the] property to a new or different
use." Treas. Reg. S 1.263(a)-l(b)(2).
b. In distinguishing the situation from
Plainfield Union, the Service noted that in
its original condition, the taxpayer's
property contained the asbestos-laden
equipment: "the costs incurred to remove
asbestos from the taxpayer's boiler house did
not return the property to the state that it
was in before the condition necessitating the
expenditures arose." By contrast, in
Plainfield Union, the tuberculation of the
pipes' lining (which necessitated the
deductible expenditures) developed after the
taxpayer had installed the pipes.
2. Intermediate vs. Permanent Conseauences
In TAM 9411002, the Service also emphasized the
permanent nature of the remediation.
a. By removing the asbestos-laden equipment, the
taxpayer physically altered the property,
thereby permanently eliminating the defect in
the boiler house.
b. The Service relied on American BeMberg CorD.
v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 361, 377 (1946),
flnafa., 1948-2 C.B. 5, aff'd Rer curiam, 177
F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1949) (allowing the
taxpayer to deduct costs incurred to prevent
cave-ins due to a geological fault and
stressing that the taxpayer had not cured the
original geological defect, but had dealt
with the intermediate consequences) and
Plainfield Union, .39 T.C. 333, 338 (allowing
the taxpayer to deduct the costs of cleaning
and re-lining its pipes and emphasizing that
the new lining temporarily eliminated a
maintenance problem, but that it "was not a
permanent addition- to -the pipe").
D. Encapsulation Costs - Deduction Allowed
I T_41identa! Repair Costs
The Service found..that the costs incurred to
encapsulate the damaged pipe insulation were
incidental repair costs that neither increased the
value nor prolonged the useful life of the
115
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taxpayer's property beyond what it was before the
asbestos-containing pipe insulation became
damaged.
a. In support of this conclusion, the Service
cited Midland Empire Packing Co. v.
Commissioner, 14 T.C. 635 (1950), acq., 1950-
2 C.B. 3 (allowing the taxpayer to deduct as
a repair expense the cost of concrete lining
designed to prevent oil seepage).
b. The Service noted that in Midland EmDire, the
Tax Court had specifically noted that the
expenditure "merely served to keep the
property in an operating condition over its
probable useful life for the purpose for
which it was" intended. Midland Empire, 14
T.C. at 641.
c. The Service explained that the encapsulation
reduced, but did not eliminate, the threat of
exposure to asbestos, and that because of the
continued presence of asbestos, the property
was not adaptable to a new or different use.
2. Intermediate Conseauences
Citing American Bembera, 10 T.C. at 377, the
Service found that because the asbestos was not
permanently removed from the warehouse, the
encapsulation had only temporary effect and thus
dealt with "intermediate consequences."
a. The taxpayer will have to monitor asbestos
levels and to re-encapsulate or remove
insulation that becomes worn or damaged. See
American Bembera, 10 T.C. at jL (noting the
required continuance of the inspection
program).
b. The continued existence of asbestos in the
warehouse poses the same threat to the
efficient operation of the warehouse (caused
by potential exposure to asbestos) that
existed before the taxpayer undertook the
encapsulation project. See id. (noting that
the original defect still exists).
3. No Plan of Rphabili Oinn
In TAM 9411002, the Service recognized that while
some courts have denied deductions for "incidental
repairs" where the repairs were actually part of a
significant improvement program, the encapsulation
116
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expenditures were truly incidental repairs. The
Service cited Mountain Fuel Suppv Co. v. United
tat, 449 F.2d 816, 822 (10th Cir. 1971),
Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.
1, 17 (1979), and Niagara Mohawk Power corD. V.
united States, 558 F.2d 1379 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
a. In Niauara Mohawk, the-Tax Court allowed a
deduction for the costs of clamping joints
that were leaking even though, at the same
time, the taxpayer also clamped non-leaking
joints as a form of preventive maintenance.
The Tax Court explained that it was more cost
effective to clamp all the joints once the
taxpayer had excavated down to the pipeline
that contained leaking joints. Nigar
Mohawt, 558 F.2d at 1383.
b. The Tax court in Niagara Mohawk found that
the number of joints clamped constituted a
small percentage of the system's total
joints. Id.L at 1389.
c. Similarly, in TAM 9411002, the Service found
that the encapsulation activities were
"incidental in relation to the taxpayer's
overall operations" because the encapsulation
only involved damaged areas of pipe
insulation, and a significant number of pipes
containing asbestos insulation remained
unencapsulated.
E. Depreciation Period
The Service also determined that the applicable
depreciation period for the capitalization of costs
associated with the asbestos removal from the boiler
house was 31.5 years.
1. The Service stated that the expenditures should be
considered "nonresidential real property" for the
purpose of ascertaining the applicable recovery
period under S 168(c)(1).
2. As nonresidential real property, the expenditures
had a depreciable life of 31.5 years. (As a
result of the enactment of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, the depreciation
period for nonresidc-ntil r-al praperty is 39
years).
117
- 18 -
F. Criticism of TAM 9411002
From a tax policy perspective, commentators have
criticized TAM 9411002 as encouraging taxpayers to
create temporary fixes to environmental hazards instead
of permanently solving the problem. See. e.g., Lester
Droller, Special Report: IRS Continues Flawed Analysis
of Treatment of Environmental Cleanup Costs: TAM
9411002, 63 Tax Notes 5 (1994).
VI. REVENUE RULING 94-38 - SOIL REMEDIATION AND GROUNDWATER
A. The facts of Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-25 I.R.B. 4, are as
follows: A taxpayer owned a manufacturing plant that
discharged hazardous waste. The taxpayer had buried
this waste on its land, which had not been contaminated
when the taxpayer purchased it in 1970. In response to
environmental requirements, the taxpayer began to
remediate the soil and groundwater, and to construct
groundwater treatment facilities.
B. The Service reversed its position in TAM 9315004, and
allowed the deduction of costs incurred to remediate
the contaminated soil and groundwater (other than the
costs to construct the groundwater treatment
facilities). The Service required capitalization of
the costs of constructing groundwater treatment
facilities.
C. Soil and Groundwater Remediation - Deduction
1. Plainfield Union Test
a. The Service stated that the appropriate test
for determining whether these particular
expenditures added value to the property was
stated in Plainfield Union, 39 T.C. at 338
(comparing the status of the asset after the
expenditure to the status of the asset "prior
to the condition necessitating the
expenditure").
b. Applying this test, the Service found that
these expenditures did not increase the
property's value because the taxpayer "merely
restored its soil and-groundwater to their
approximate condition before they were
contaminated" by the hazardous waste from the
manufacturing operations.
I18
- 19 -
2. Section 263 and Treasury Reculation Section1,263 (a)-(1)
In allowing the deduction, the Service stated that
neither S 263 nor Treas. Reg. S 1.263(a)-i would
deny the deduction.
a. Treas. Reg. S 1.263(a)-i disallows deductions
for "permanent improvements or betterments
made to increase the value of any property."
This includes amounts paid "to add to the
value, or substantially prolong the useful
life, of property owned by the taxpayer . . .
or to adapt the property to a new or
different use."
b. Echoing the language of this regulation, the
Service found that the expenditures at issue
(1) do not produce permanent improvements;
(2) do not prolong the useful life of the
land; and
(3) do not adapt the land to a new or
different use.
c. In a remark perhaps suggesting that the
Service will approach expenditures to clean
up contaminated land differently than
expenditures to solve other environmental
problems, the Service additionally recognized
that "since the land is not subject to an
allowance for depreciation, amortization, or
depletion, the amounts expended to restore
the land to its original condition are not
subject to capitalization under S 263(a)-2."
3. IflQPC-
The Service also referred to the future benefits
test articulated in INDOPCO. Inc. v. Commissioner,
112 S.Ct. 1039, 1044-45 (1992), and found that the
expenditures do not provide significant future
benefits.
4. The Service statedthat the outcome would be the
same regardless of whether the taxpayer co-tin...
manufacturing-operations that discharge hazardous
waste, or discontinued those operations and held
the land in an idle state.
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D. Groundwater Treatment Facilities - Capitalization
Both the direct construction costs and an allocable
portion of the indirect construction costs of the
groundwater treatment facilities must be capitalized.
I. Because these facilities were designed to extract,
treat, and monitor contaminated groundwater, they
have a useful life substantially beyond the
taxable year in which they are constructed.
Treas. Reg. S 1.263(a)-2(a).
2. The construction of the facilities constitutes
"production" under S 263A(g)(1).
E. Modification of Revenue Rulina 88-57
The Service also modified Rev. Rul. 88-57 to the extent
that the earlier ruling implied that the increase in
value test of Plainfield Union can only be used when
there is sudden and unanticipated damage to an asset.
VII. AFTERMATH OF THE REVENUE RULING
A. Reversal of Service Position in TAM 9315004
By allowing the deduction of soil remediation
expenditures, Rev. Rul. 94-38 effectively reverses the
Service's position in TAM 9315004 (requiring the
capitalization of expenditures to remove PCBs
introduced into the soil by the taxpayer's operations).
B. Remarks by the Service
1. Rev. Rul, 94-38 Limited to the Facts
According to at least one government official
involved in the drafting of Rev. Rul. 94-38, the
ruling is limited to land remediation expenditures
in situations where the taxpayer caused the
damage. See remarks of Merrill D. Feldstein at an
August 6, 1994, meeting of the American Bar
Association Tax Section (published in Tax
Analysts' Highlights & Documents, Aug. 9, 1994;
available electronically at 94 TNT 155-6).
a. The ruling does not apply to several
situations still under study, including the
following:
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(1) asbestos abatement;
(2) removal of storage tanks;
(3) cleanup of preacquisition contamination;
and
(4) costs incurred in cleaning up property
before selling it.
b. For other issues, the Service is taking a
"wait and see" approach, postponing further
guidance until Rev. Rul. 94-38 prompts some
well-defined reactions.
2. Rev, Rul. 94-38 ADDlies Broadly To Contaminated
Land Situations
a. Shortly after the ruling was released,
Treasury stated that it expected the ruling
to have "broad applicability" for situations
involving contaminated land. See
Environmental Cleanup Revenue Has 'Broad
Applicability,' Official Says, BNA Daily Tax
Report for Executives, no. 109, at G-7 (June
9, 1994) (remarks of Robert Kilinskis).
(1) The ruling applies to contaminated land
that the taxpayer both owns and does not
own.
(2) The ruling applies across a wide variety
of industries, including public
utilities and retailers.
b. The future breadth of the application of
Plainfield Union will determine whether the
ruling will apply to the cleanup of a
combination of preacquisition and
postacquisition contamination.
C. Private Sector Reaction
1. The private sector has generally applauded the
outcome of the revenue ruling. The ruling is
sound from a tax policy perspective because it
encourages voluntary environmental cleanup -- at
least with respect to contaminated soil -- by
reversing the Service's position in TAM 9315004
(expenditures to remediate soil contaminated with
PCBs must be capitalized).
2. Extension to Asbestos
Commentators have requested guidance indicating
that the ruling extends to asbestos remediation
costs. However, the Service has stated that
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asbestos remediation is still under study and thus
is not covered by the ruling.
3. Certain Factors May No Longer Be DisDositive
a. While there has been disagreement among the
commentators, some have suggested that the
Service also overruled TAMs 9240004 and
9411002 by applying the increase in value
test of Plainfield Union, which the Service
had rejected in the two TAMs. At a minimum,
the Service may have implicitly abandoned
certain factors that were significant in the
two TAMs.
(1) Rev. Rul. 94-38 does not acknowledge
that cleanup activities add value to the
property because they decrease health
risks and thus reduce the taxpayer's
potential liability for hazardous
working conditions. See TAMs 9411002,
9240004.
(2) The ruling does not mention that soil
remediation will make the property more
attractive to potential buyers,
investors, and lenders. See TAM
9411002.
(3) The ruling does not employ a "general
plan of rehabilitation" analysis. fee
TAM 9411002.
(4) The ruling does not address the
significance of compliance with
government regulations, as opposed to
voluntary environmental cleanup. SMM
TAM 9240004.
4. Land vs. Other Provert v.
a. Commentators have suggested that Rev. Rul.
94-38 should be interpreted as applying only
to land remediation because the Plainfiel
Union increase in value test cannot be
extended to property such as asbestos.
(1) In Plainfield Union, 39 T.C. at 338, the
.Tax Cou-rt !compared the vaolue -of the
asset after the remediation with the
"status of.the asset prior to the
condition necessitating the
expenditure."
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(2) Because property containing asbestos is
originally constructed with the
asbestos, it is arguably impossible to
determine the value of the property
before "the condition necessitating the
expenditure." See 64 Tax Notes 338
(July 18, 1994).
b. Other commentators have stated that
Plainfield Union can apply to asbestos
remediation by treating the "status of the
asset prior to the condition necessitating
the expenditure" as the value of the asset
before the discovery that asbestos is
hazardous.
c. A factor that may cut in favor of current
deductions for land remediation, but not for
other property, is that the taxpayer cannot
take advantage of any amount capitalized
until the property is sold. In TAM 9315004,
the Service may have taken into account this
hardship when it allowed the taxpayer to add
the costs of the PCB cleanup to the
depreciable basis of its equipment.
5. Commentators have suggested that Rev. Rul. 94-38
was as much a result of political pressure to
allow the current deduction of environmental
expenditures as a reasoned analysis of the law.
D. Questions That Remain Open
In addition to the subjects still under study, see
supra, Rev. Rul. 94-38 leaves other questions open.
1. A Treasury official has stated that the ruling
does not apply to lead paint removal. See
Environmental Cleanup Revenue Has 'Broad
Applicability,' Official Says, BNA Daily Tax
Report for Executives, no. 109, at G-7 (June 9,
1994) (remarks of Robert Kilinskis).
2. The- ruling does not address whether the taxpayer
must own the land being remediated.
3. The ruling does not address whether the cleanup
must be voluntary.
4. Commentators have raised the example of monitoring
wells to suggest that in certain situations, Rev.
Rul. 94-38 might produce two conflicting results.
Monitoring wells are less elaborate structures
than groundwater treatment facilities. Arguably,
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the purpose of installing monitoring wells is to
facilitate groundwater testing, not to improve the
property. However, the Service could treat the
costs either like the soil remediation
expenditures or like the costs of constructing the
water treatment facility.
VIII. THE COURTS' TREATMENT OF EXPENDITURES THAT RELATE TO
LAND OR THE ENVIRONMENT
A. Environmental Cases
1. Woolrich Woolen Mills
In Woolrich Woolen Mills v. United States, 289 F.2d 444
(3rd Cir. 1961), the taxpayer was engaged in a
manufacturing process which resulted in the discharge,
directly into a public stream, of a large quantity of
water containing dyes and woolen fibers.
a. Following tightening of Pennsylvania's en-
vironmental laws, the Sanitary Water Board
directed the taxpayer to discontinue all dis-
charge of water or to submit satisfactory
plans for the treatment of the water so as to
eliminate the pollution elements from the
water.
b. In order to satisfy the Sanitary Water Board,
the taxpayer planned and constructed a water
filtration plant.
c. The taxpayer claimed that the cost of con-
structing the filtration plant was deductible
because it was necessary to save the life of
the business.
d. The government argued, and the court agreed,
that because the filtration plant had a use-
ful life in excess of one year the cost of
construction must be a non-deductible capital
expenditure.
e. Finally, the court rejected the taxpayer's
assertion that the expenditures did not add
any value to the taxpayer's property.
2. Midland Empire Packing
a. In Midland Empire Packing Co. v.
Commissioner, 14 T.C. 635 (1950), the tax-
payer was a meat packing company whose base-
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ment was used for the curing of hams and
bacon and the storage of meat and hides.
b. The basement rooms were not sealed against
water, and had historically been subject to
seepage which did not interfere with the use
of the rooms for their intended purpose.
c. In 1943, the taxpayer found that oil was
seeping into the groundwater in its area from
an oil refinery located 300 yards upgrade
from the taxpayer's plant. When this water
seeped into the basement storage rooms it
created a fire hazard and made the rooms
unusable; federal meat inspectors directed
the taxpayer to oilproof the basement or to
shut down its plant.
d. In order to preserve its operations, the tax-
payer hired a contractor to add concrete
linings to the basement in order to seal it
against oil.
e. In finding the costs of oilproofing to be
deductible, the court focused on the fact
that the expenses "did not add to the value
or prolong the expected life of the property
over what they were before the event occurred
which made the repairs necessary." 14 T.C.
at 641. In this regard, the court laid the
groundwork for its later decision in
Plainfield Union.
B. Cases relating to land but not directly to the
environment
Additional insight into the factors which should con-
trol the tax treatment of environmental cleanup costs
may be found from an analysis of a variety of cases
dealing with costs incurred with respect to land used
by the taxpayer in its trade or business.
1. American Bembera
In American Bembera, supra, the taxpayer incurred
sizable costs to prevent future cave-ins after it
was discovered that its factory had been built on
a geological fault.
a. At the time the plant was built the taxpayer
did not know of, nor -did it have reason to
know of, the existence of the fault.
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b. After a number of cave-ins, additional geo-
logical testing revealed the existence of the
fault, and the taxpayer was informed that it
must undertake a large-scale program of
drilling and grouting to prevent future cave-
ins or else abandon its plant. Having re-
ceived this advice, the taxpayer chose to
undertake -the program necessary to preserve
its plant.
c. The court found that "the purpose [of the
program] was not to improve, better, extend
or increase the original plant, nor to pro-
long its original useful life. . . . the
purpose of the expenditures was to enable
petitioner to continue the plant in operation
not on any new or better scale, but on the
same scale and, so far as possibly, as
efficiently as it had operated before." 10
T.C. at 376.
d. Furthermore, the court noted that "Ei]n
connection with the physical nature of the
work, the drilling and grouting was not a
work of construction, nor the creating of
anything new." Id.
e. The court also quoted with approval from
Buckland v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 681
(D. Conn. 1946), where it was stated that
"[the government's) contention appears to be
that repairs are only those mendings of the
fabric which recur year by year. This is not
consistent with the meaning given 'ordinary
and necessary' in Welch v. Helverina, 290
U.S. 11."
2. C ol/Alncmod
In Collinawood v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 937
(1953), the taxpayer incurred costs in terracing
his farms to prevent the loss of topsoil from
water erosion. The tax court. found that the
terracing "did not increase the value of the land
or its products"; was undertaken "for the purpose
of maintaining the farms in an ordinarily effici-
ent condition for carrying on the kind of farming
which had been followed before the terracing was
done; nd w:a for pra.eer-ing the normal produc-
tivity of the farm lands." The court concluded
that "[e]xpenditures for such purposes are not
capital in nature." 20 T.C. at 942-43.
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3. Mt. Morris Drive-In
In contrast to Collinwood, the Tax Court required
the taxpayer in Mt. Morris Drive-In Theatre v.o.mmissioner to capitalize costs incurred in
constructing a drainage system for its land.
Crucial to the court's decision was its finding
that "it was obvious at the time when the drive-in
theater was constructed that a drainage system
would be required . . . until this was
accomplished, petitioner's capital investment was
incomplete." 25 T.C. 272, 275 (1955), aff'd, 238
F.2d 85 (6th cir. 1956).
IX. MATCHING OF INCOME AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
A. As a general matter, proper tax accounting requires a
matching of items of income with associated items of
expense. The purpose of the capitalization rules is,
in large part, to ensure this result. See I
Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1043 (1992).
1. Two of the factors under consideration by the
Service appear to relate, at least in part, to
this principle.
a. Whether the property on which the cleanup is
performed will produce future income; and
b. Whether the problem necessitating the cleanup
was present when the property was acquired by
the taxpayer or if it arose in the course of
the taxpayer's business.
2. In a great number of cases, these factors will
likely point in opposite directions; i.e, the
property will produce future income (militating in
favor of capitalization) but the problem will have
arisen in the course of the taxpayer's business
(militating in favor of deductibility).
B. Financial Accounting
Abstract No. 90-8 of Emerging Issues Task Force of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board addresses the
treatment of environmental cleanup costs for financial
accounting purposes, and finds in general such costs
should be treated as crent-..- ....
1. An exception to the general rule of expensing is
provided where
T27
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a. The costs incurred extend the life, increase
the capacity, or improve the safety or ef-
ficiency of property owned, when compared to
the condition of the property when originally
constructed or acquired;
b. The costs are incurred to prevent or mitigate
environmental contamination from future
operations and activities; or
c. The costs are incurred in preparing for sale
prvperty that is currently held for sale.
2. Treas. Reg. S 1.446-1(a)(2) provides that "a
method of accounting which reflects the consistent
application of generally accepted accounting
principles . . . will ordinarily be regarded as
clearly reflecting income." This is because GAAP,
like the rules for income tax accounting is, in
general, concerned with the proper matching of
items income with the associated items of expense.
a. Where the condition necessitating an environ-
mental cleanup is the result of the tax-
payer's past business activities, the costs
of the cleanup are most properly attributable
to previously earned income. This is especi-
ally true where the condition could have been
prevented through additional expenses in the
past. In such a situation, it can be argued,
the taxpayer's past income was artificially
inflated because the costs associated with
its business activities were not taken into
account at the time the associated income was
recognized. However, under a system of an-
nual accounting it is not possible to go back
and change the taxpayer's income for those
prior years. In the absence of such treat-
ment, the best matching is achieved through
allowing a current deduction for environ-
mental cleanup costs.
b. This reasoning, obviously, does not apply
where the condition necessitating the cleanup
is n=g a result of the taxpayer's past busi-
ness activities.
C. Uniform capitalization Rules
The uniform capitalization rules of section 263A re-
quire the capitalization of any costs incurred with
respect to real or tangible personal property produced
by the taxpayer. Treas. Reg. S 1.263A-lT(a). These
rules may prevent a formidable barrier to the deduction
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of cleanup costs where the creation of tangible
property is part of the plan of remediation.
D. Relevance of Prior Depreciation
Regulations under section 263 provide that capitaliza-
tion is required for any amount expended in restoring
property for which an allowance has been made in the
form of depreciation. Treas. Reg. S 1.263(a)-i.
1. Although this provision will generally not be
directly applicable to environmental cleanup costs
(because such costs are not generally incurred to
"restore" losses which have previously been ac-
counted for through depreciation), it serves as an
additional indication that the concept of "match-
ing" is of paramount importance in determining the
correct treatment of cleanup costs.
2. Where a taxpayer has already claimed the benefit
of a tax deduction for depreciation (or from a
loss deduction upon the retirement of an asset),
it is clearly correct to deny a deduction for
expenditures incurred in restoring or replacing
the asset in question.
3. Where in contrast, no such benefit has been
realized, deductibility is a much more reasonable
result. In this regard, cleanup costs incurred to
restore the value of nondepreciable land are
qualitatively different from costs that are in-
curred to restore or replace depreciated equip-
ment.
4. Taxpayers may be able use this argument to rebut
the Service's assertion in TAM 9315004 that "if
the Plainfield Union 'increase in value' test was
the only factor used in determining whether an
expenditure should be categorized as a deductible
repair or capital expenditure, then any replace-
ment of a capital asset would also be deductible."
E. Reclamation Costs
The tax treatment of reclamation expenses incurred to
restore strip-mined land to its original condition are
somewhat analogous to environmental cleanup costs and
can be used to support current deductibility.
1. ,Like environmental remediation costs, reclamation
expenses are -often incurred pursuant to state or
federal laws, the purpose of which are to ensure
that land is not permanently damaged by industrial
or commercial use.
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2. The Service and taxpayers have frequently clashed
over the timing of deductions for reclamation ex-
penses -- taxpayers claiming that deductions may
be claimed at the time that the mining occurs by
setting up a reserve, and the Service arguing that
no deduction is allowable prior to actually in-
curring the cleanup costs. See e_, DeieCa
Co. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930 (3rd Cir. 1959);
Harrold v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir.
1951); Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Commissioner,
77 T.C. 1369 (1981).
3. However, it has apparently never been challenged
that the costs need not be capitalized into the
basis of the land.
F. Environmental Policy
Sound environmental policy indicates that the tax
treatment of environmental cleanup costs should not
provide taxpayers with a disincentive to undertaking
environmental remediation. In general, allowing a
deduction for cleanup costs will encourage more volun-
tary compliance with environmental laws. In particu-
lar, as noted in IV.B.2.d, above, it would be particu-
larly bad environmental policy to adopt a rule that
ties the deductibility of cleanup costs to whether the
costs are incurred voluntarily or involuntarily.
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